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Government planning in a small oil economy: 
factors limiting the industrial 
diversification efforts of Qatar 
Robert E. Looney• 
The oil reserves of Qatar are small compared to those of some of its 
neighbouring States in the Persian Gulf. The country has estimated crude 
oil reserves of 3,200 million barrels, or less than 1 per cent of the world 
total. This is equivalent to about 30 years of output at current levels, and 
represents a fraction of reserves in the Persian Gulf region. On the other 
hand, the country does have significant gas reserves, estimated at 
4,400 million cubic metres, or more than 4 per cent of the world total. 
Only the United Arab Emirates, the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), the Islamic Republic of Iran and Abu Dhabi have 
larger gas reserves (1]. 
Because of its limited natural wealth, Qatar was the first of the Arab 
States in the Persian Gulf region to commit itself firmly to industrial 
diversification. To this end, in 1972 the Government of Qatar com -
missioned a detailed study of the country's development opportunities. 
The result was the creation in: 1973 of a national plan providing 
development guidelines for the next two decades. 
The plan emphasized the need for acceleration in housing and paid 
special attention to the development of the capital city of Doha. It also 
encouraged the development of light and heavy industries and expansion 
of the fishing industry. The plan concentrated on infrastructure and 
diversification of the economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess industrialization efforts of 
Qatar to date. In doing so, questions such as the following will be raised: 
has the country made significant progress towards industrial 
diversification and in what sense; how has the industrial performance of 
Qatar compared with that of neighbouring Arab economies in the Persian 
Gulf region; what particular problems will hinder industrial 
diversification; and what are the prospects for the future? 
*Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California 
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A. Recent economic trends 
Crude oil accounted for just under 30 per cent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of Qatar in 1987. Between 1983 and 1987, it accounted 
for 91-94 per cent of export earnings. Since 1981, Qatar has, with the 
other States of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun -
tries (OPEC), suffered from the impact of the world oil glut. Between 
1983 and 1987, the oil sector declined by 15 per cent, with the non -oil 
sectors increasing by only 0.3 per cent of the period as a whole. 
The manufacturing sector in Qatar accounted for 5 per cent of total 
GDP and 11 per cent of non-oil GDP 1980. There was a steady increase 
in manufacturing output in the 1980s. By 1987, manufacturing thus 
accounted for 9.9 per cent of total GDP, or 14.3 per cent of non-oil GDP. 
It is noteworthy that this increase in the share of manufacturing in GDP 
is overstated as a result of the decline of the oil sector. While the increase 
in the share of manufacturing in non-oil GDP is more suggestive of the 
success achieved by the country in industrial diversification, even here an 
inflated figure is obtained because of various subsidies, including low 
utility rates and low rents received by industry. 
B. Industrial efficiency 
One aim of industrial planning has been to encourage the 
establishment of industries that use the output of the heavy industries of 
Qatar as intermediate products. Industries producing tiles, precast 
concrete items, fine lime and plastic products fit this category rather well. 
Still, the combined demand for cement, steel bars, lime, and polyethylene 
is only a fraction of the total output of the industries concerned. 
As might be expected, these four heavy manufacturing industries 
accounted for the bulk of the gross value of output and value added. 
Thus, the gross value of output in the chemical and plastic products, non -
metallic mineral products, and basic metal industries amounted to 
1,905.8 million Qatari riyals (OR)"' in 1983. That was nearly 72 per cent 
of the total gross value of output in manufacturing industry. The 
combined value added in these three industry categories also amounted to 
just under 78 per cent of total value added in the manufacturing sector in 
1983. 
In terms of value added, UNIDO [2] data provide another picture 
of the dual economy of Qatar, as described below: 
•Based on the following exchange rate between the United States dollar ($) and the 
Qatari riyal: US$ = QR 3.65. 
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(a) The share of value added in gross output is highest in the 
manufacture of fabricated metal products (106.7 per cent), followed by 
jewellery (87.6 per cent), and fertilizers and pesticides (84.7 per cent); 
(b) The high share of value added in the gross output of most of the 
heavy industries partly reflects the technical progress that has been 
injected into the productive process in this sector; 
(c) The somewhat low share of value added in the gross output 
(23.3 per cent) of the manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco is a 
reflection of the high cost of imported raw materials and services in this 
sector. The country is almost totally dependent on imports for 
manufactured food items. 
The Central Statistical Organization, in its industrial survey of 
1983 [3], attempted to measure productivity levels in manufacturing 
industries. That survey produced several interesting patterns: 
(a) In 1983, 15,558 persons worked in manufacturing industries, of 
which 4,058 worked in non -metallic mineral products and 2,557 in 
chemical and petroleum industries; 
(b) Value added per employee was the highest in petroleum 
refineries (QR 480,000), followed by industrial chemicals other than 
fertilizers (QR 360,000), and fertilizers and pesticides (QR 316,000); 
(c) Labour productivity was lowest in the manufacture of soap, 
cleaning preparations and perfumes (OR 10,000); 
(d) Many industries - slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat, 
and grain mill products - operate under economies of scale and thus have 
relatively high working costs. 
As Whittingham [4) has noted, a key problem for Qatar is that a 
handful of small export-oriented factories, of the kind found in any oil-
producing country, will never be competitive with those of larger 
production facilities. Also, the domestic market of Qatar has a minimal 
need for heavy industrial products. This is another aspect of the country's 
dualistic industrial structure. The extent to which problems exist is 
clearly an empirical question. Yet it is one that should be addressed 
before any conclusions can be drawn about the future development of the 
manufacturing sector. 
' C. Comparative analysis 
In an effort to compare the development pattern of Qatar with that 
of other Arab countries, especially neighbouring oil economies, a factor 
analysis was performed. Factor analysis was chosen as the appropriate 
technique since it can identify a relatively small number of elements 
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representing relationships among sets of many interrelated variables. For 
example, concepts such as sectoral diversification may be expressed as a 
linear combination of factors that represent different aspects of this 
phenomenon. In the analysis below, these measures include the sectoral 
share in non-oil GDP and absorption (total expenditures). Each measure 
represents a different aspect of diversification. Combined into a single 
dimension, they provide a more complete measure of diversification than 
does any single measure alone [5]. 
D. Methodology 
Factor analyses is also appropriate for dealing with the problem at 
hand since it can compute a relative ranking index without resorting to an 
arbitrary weighing system [6]. The technique is also very amenable (see 
annex) to the most recent database available, that provided by the Arab 
Monetary Fund. This organization, representing the Arab countries of 
North Africa and Western Asia, recently compiled and refined the 
national income statistics of its member countries. Because of its larger 
sample size, this database now allows for more precise estimates of output 
and s~ructural change over time than was possible from individual country 
data compiled by standard sources such as the International Monetary 
Fund [7]. 
Factor analysis created an index representing each of the four main 
areas of sectoral output: manufacturing, distribution, services and 
construction. Each sectoral index contains two measures of output: share 
of non-oil gross domestic product; and absorption (total consumption and 
investment expenditures). Analysis focused on three years: 1974, at the 
beginning of the oil boom; 1981,.at the end of the oil boom; and 1985, the 
last year for which the Arab Monetary Fund [8] provides data. The 
data set covers the 20 member countries of the Arab Monetary Fund in 
1985: Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
The factor analysis included all 20 countries. However, to save 
space, tables 1, 2 and 3 below include only the results for Qatar and (as 
a frame of reference) the other oil producers in the region: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates. 
The factor analysis identified four main sectors: manufacturing, 
construction, distribution and services. These are the "sectoral 
dimensions" presented in part (a) of the tables. The sectoral shares of 
non-oil gross domestic product and absorption (defined as consumption 
and investment expenditures) each represent one of the four main sectors. 
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Table 1. Qatar and the oil producers: factors affecting relative 
industrial performance - linkage and shift effects, 1975 
Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: Factor 4: 
Country manufacturing construction distribution services 
(a) Sectoral dimension (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.84 0.13 
United Arab Emirates -1.15 2.00 1.88 -0.90 
Bahrain 2.74 0.35 0.91 -0.01 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.53 1.10 -0.21 0.59 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.83 -0.50 2.08 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.73 -0.98 -0.60 1.35 
(b) Impact of oil (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.18(=) 1.79(=) 1.90(=) 0.14(+) 
United Arab Emirates -1.23(=) 1.66(-) 1.90(=) -1.00(=) 
Bahrain 2.69(=) -0.38(=) 0.92(=) 0.06(=) 
Saudi Arabia 0.98(=) 1.81(+) -1.09( =) 0.70(=) 
Oman -1.56(=) 1.03(=) -0.20(=) 0.50(=) 
Kuwait 0.21(+) 0.24(+) -0.90(-) 2.22(=) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.83(=) 0.57(-) -0.40(+) 1.20(-) 
(c) Impact of domestic linkages (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.43(+) 1.86(=) 1.64(-) 0.71(+) 
United Arab Emirates -).33(-) 1.83(-) 1.99(+) 0.14(+) 
Bahrain 2.51(-) -0.31(=) 0.85(=) 0.94(+) 
Saudi Arabia 0.97(=) 1.22(+) -0.99(=) -0.50(-) 
Oman -1.32(+) 1.14(=) -0.04(+) -1.49(-) 
Kuwait 0.60(+) -0.25(+) -0.43(=) -2.29(-) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.32(+) 0.98(=) -0.58(=) 0.98(-) 
(d) Impact of Dutch-disease effects (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.19(-) 1.73(=) 1.25(-) 0.18(=) 
United Arab Emirates -1.01(-) 2.25(+) 1.30(-) -0.01(-) 
Bahrain 2.73(-) 0.02(+) 0.65(-) -0.17(-) 
Saudi Arabia 1.04(+) 1. 70(+) -1.42(-) 0.36(-) 
Oman -1.71(-) 0.48(-) 0.41(+) 0.89(+) 
Kuwait 0.07(+) 0.90(=) -0.04(+) 1.93(-) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.96(-) 0.34(-) 0.07(+) 1.64(+) 
Note: See annex for a description of the factor model and its use in generating factor 
scores. Figures in parentheses depict the direction of movement in ranking relative to sector 
dimension factor scores associated with each structural phenomenon: the impact of oil 
revenues; the impact of domestic linkage; and the impact of Dutch-disease factors. The signs 
(+ and -) depict the direction of sectoral movement associated with each impact. For 
brevity, only the oil country results are reported here. 
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Table 2. Qatar and the oil producers: factors affecting relative 
industrial performance · linkage and shift effects, 1981 
Country 
Qatar 





Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Qatar 





Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(a) 
Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: 
manufacturing construction distribution 
Sectoral dimension (factor scores) 
0.50 0.37 0.89 
0.59 1.22 1.26 
2.32 -0.31 2.26 
0.24 2.07 -0.97 
-1.67 0.24 1.34 
-O.Q2 -0.33 0.56 
-0.22 1.54 -0.88 
(b) Impact of oil (factor scores) 
0.12(-) 0.92(+) 1.26(+) 
0.45(-) 1.32(+) 1.30(=) 
2.33(=) -0.38(=) 1.97(-) 
0.06(-) 2.17(+) -0.66(+) 
-1.85(-) 0.57(+) 1.45(+) 
0.31(-) 0.17(+) 0.87(+) 
-1.11(+) 1.28(-) -0.91(=) 
(c) Impact of domestic linkages (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.44(=) 0.47(+) 1.05(+) 
United Arab Emirates 0.47(+) 1.24(=) 1.19(=) 
Bahrain 2.41( =) -0.54(-) 2.22( =) 
Saudi Arabia 0.15(+) 1.98(=) -0.85(=) 
Oman -1. 75( +) 0.54( +) 1.32( =) 
Kuwait -0.26(+) 0.11(+) 0.65(=) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -1.21(-) 1.47(=) -0.84(=) 
(d) Impact of Dutch-disease effects (factor scores) 
Qatar 





Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Note: See note to table 1. 
0.22(-) 0.24(-) 0.85( =) 
0.87(+) 1.18(=) 1.15(+) 
1.78(-) -0.44(-) 2.34(=) 
-0.12(-) 1.85(-) -0.96(=) 
-1.37(+)" 0.45(+) 1.26(=) 
-0.44(-) -0.23(+) 0.49(=) 
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Table 3. Qatar and the oil producers: factors affecting relative 
industrial performance · linkage and shift effects, 1985 
Country Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: Factor 4: 
manufacmring construction distribution services 
(a) Sectoral dimension (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
United Arab Emirates 1.37 1.23 1.34 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.59 
Saudi Arabia -0.16 1.60 -0.78 0.57 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.94 1.53 -0.83 1.04 
(b) Impact of oil (factor scores) 
Qatar 1.03(+) 0.20(=) -0.09(-) 2.36(-) 
United Arab Emirates 0.88(-) 1.39(+) 1.63(+) 0.77(+) 
Bahrain 1.02(+) 0.30(=) 1.63(+) 0.12(-) 
Saudi Arabia -0.15(=) 1.53(=) -0.75(=) 0.59(=) 
Oman -1.72(-) 0.50(+) 1.37(+) 1.01(+) 
Kuwait -0.62(-) 0.84(=) -0.01(+) 1.49(+) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.77(+) 1.47(=) -0.85(=) 0.98(=) 
(c) Impact of domestic linkages (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.51(-) 0.33(=) -0.12(-) 2.51(-) 
United Arab Emirates 1.35(=) 1.33(+) 1.54(+) 0.34(+) 
Bahrain 0.80(=) 0.37(=) 1. 70(-) 0.37(-) 
Saudi Arabia 0.02(+) 1.53(=) -0.57(+) 0.67(+) 
Oman -1.52(=) 0.48(+) 1.44(+) 0.61(+) 
Kuwait -0.14(+) -0.82(+) 0.24(+) 1.33(+) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -1.04(-) 1.51(=) -0.80(=) 1.05(=) 
(d) Impact of Dutch-disease effects (factor scores) 
Qatar 0.87(=) 0.48(+) 0.06(-) 2.91(+) 
United Arab Emirates 1.25(-) 1.23(=) 1.24(-) 0.02(=) 
Bahrain 0.88(=) 0.44(=) 1.89(=) 0.62(=) 
Saudi Arabia -0.35(-) • 1.56(=) -0.85(=) 0.54(=) 
Oman -1.58(=) 0.30(=) 1.14(=) 0.14(-) 
Kuwait -0.70(-) -0.97(-) -0.26(=) 0.84(-) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.88(=) 1.48(=) -0.75(=) 1.02(=) 
Note: See note to table 1. 
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The resulting factor scores for each sector (again the sectoral dimension 
part of tables 1, 2 and 3) therefore represent the relative ranking (in terms 
of the development of each sector) of each of the 20 Arab countries. As 
noted above, for brevity the presentation includes only the factor scores 
of Qatar and the other regional oil producers. 
In analysing the factor scores it is noteworthy that they have a mean 
of zero. In other words, the country with the highest positive factor score 
for a particular sector possesses the largest share (relative to the other 
19 sample countries) of that sector in its economy. Similarly, the country 
with the lowest (negative) factor score has the smallest share of that sector 
in its economy. The remainder of the countries lie in between. 
An interesting extension of factor analysis involves the determination 
of the relative extent to which developments in the rest of an economy 
affect (positive or negatively) national industrial diversification. Caves [9] 
notes the mechanism by which exports could act as an "engine of growth" 
(or leading sector). In the classic situation of staples, exports contribute 
to economic growth directly (through direct contributions to GDP), and 
indirectly through the medium of spread (or carry-over) effects. 
As Metwally and Tamaschke [10] show, this indirect contribution 
to growth embraces Hirschman-type linkages. It is also a sequence of 
multiplier-accelerator mechanisms, by which increases in non-oil GDP 
augment demand for sectoral outputs (manufacturing, services and 
distribution). Theoretically, indirect contributions (or spread effects) can 
continue to accrue long after some export stimulus has occurred. The 
impact of an export stimulus on the economy has many determinants, 
such as technology and the propensity to import. 
Obviously, neither the timing pattern exhibited by, nor the relative 
sizes of, direct and indirect contributions of exports to growth need to be 
fixed. They could conceivably vary between subperiods, especially over 
long periods of economic development. If the country exploits the 
investment opportunities generated by the growth of the export sector, the 
model predicts that economic growth will be a process of diversification 
about an export base. 
For policy purposes, it is of some interest to identify the factors 
responsible for these movements. Were improvements in industrial 
diversification largely the response to spread effects - increases in 
industrial demand created by an expanding non -oil sector of the 
economy? These first two effects are straightforward; Mikesell [11] 
documents them in several case studies of primary product exporters. 
A third effect is the one related•to oil-financed government expen-
ditures, the so-called "Dutch disease" effect [12]. This phenomenon 
stems from the overvaluation of the domestic exchange rate following an 
oil revenue boom. Here, the increase in domestic inflation, arising from 
stepped-up governmental expenditures, concentrates in those sectors of 
the economy that do not face foreign competition. 
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Because of the presence of foreign substitutes for most manufactured 
goods produced in Qatar, economic theory would predict a lower relative 
rate of price increase in the country's industrial sectors. Similarly, the 
resulting fall in the relative profitability of manufacturing (cheaper 
imports and price-cost squeeze) may cause a shift in resources to activities 
and products not traded in international markets. 
In Qatar, the resulting suppression of the industrial sector 
should depend in large part on the composition of industry, that is, 
the relative amounts of internationally traded and non-traded goods 
produced, and the extent to which tariffs protect domestic producers of 
traded goods from foreign competition. Cetaris paribus, the effect 
would be expected to occur in Qatar because of the dominance of the oil 
sector, and because the country is largely open to world market 
forces and foreign competition. In addition, the Dutch disease effect 
occurs in two neighbouring countries, Kuwait ((13] and (14]) and 
Saudi Arabia ((12], (15] and (16]). 
More specifically, it appears that, at least for Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, oil revenues work somewhat at cross purposes. On the 
expenditure side, oil revenues provide both effective demand and 
available credit, factors that would not otherwise be present. On the other 
hand, the competitive effects associated with exchange appreciation offset 
any cost-reducing effects arising from lower-cost imports of capital, 
intermediate goods and labour. Clearly Governments burdened with an 
overvalued real exchange rate will find it increasingly difficult to attain 
diversification through expansion of the traded goods sector. 
E. Operational procedures 
The following methodology (see annex) was used to measure the 
relative extent of the above-mentioned effects in Qatar: 
(a) The factor analysis employed, on a case-by-case basis, proxies 
for each of the three linkage effects. As noted earlier, three dates were 
relevant here: 1975 - incorporating the initial effects of the oil price 
shocks; 1981 - the end of the oil boom; and 1985 - the last year for which 
comparable data were available; 
(b) The first sets of factor analysis for each year were the sectoral 
dimension scores noted above. Each s~ctoral variable occurred twice, its 
share of non-oil GDP and as its share of absorption (consumption plus 
investment expenditures); 
(c) In the second set of four factor exercises, the sectoral linkage 
effects associated with the development of the oil sector were examined. 
Here the oil sector appears as a share of non-oil GDP and a share of 
absorption. The impact of the oil sector was measured by its correlation 
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coefficients in each of the four sectors (for brevity, the tables present 
only the resulting factor scores); 
(d) Generalized linkage effects arose in the third set of factor 
exercises, with sector correlations for non -oil GDP measuring these 
linkages. Non -oil GDP occurred in the analysis as a share of absorption 
and total GDP. As with oil, the extent of these linkage effects depended 
on the correlation of non-oil GDP variables with each of the four sectors; 
(e) Finally, the Dutch disease, or sectoral shift factors, were 
introduced with the four sectoral variables. The shift factors are reflected 
in the change in inflation (from 1974 to the year examined) and in the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (again from 1974 to the year 
examined). The assumption made is that inflationary periods will increase 
the profitability of non - tradables and reduce that of tradables, with 
manufacturing considered an internationally tradable product. The same 
was true for appreciation of the real exchange rate. As with the previous 
two linkage effects, shift effects were measured by the correlation of 
non -oil GDP variables with each of the four factors; 
(f) The factor scores were computed for each of the oil-producing 
countries (the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was added for the basis of 
comparison) in each of the four exercises. The changes in factor scores 
(indicated in parentheses in tables 1, 2 and 3) depict linkage and shift 
effects associated with each of the three effects under examination. 
Specifically, each of the structural variables - oil domestic linkages and 
the Dutch disease - will load primarily on one or more of the sectoral 
dimensions (factors). A country with a high degree of attainment or 
development of that structural variable will have a proportionately large 
change in its factor score. Using these changes (relative to the base or 
sectoral dimension), it is possible to assess the differential impact by 
country and sector (especially manufacturing) produced by each structural 
condition. 
F. Results 
Based on the change in factor scores (tables 1, 2 and 3) associated 
with each structural condition, several interesting patterns have developed 
over time. Initially, 1975 (see table 1) saw the following developments: 
(a) The oil sector had not had time to make much of an impact on 
Qatar and the other six oil producers in the region. As anticipated, this 
impact was generally positive. The.negative effects (as evidenced by the 
relative decline in factor scores from the base sectoral dimension with the 
inclusion of oil) for the United Arab Emirates and the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya were most likely the result of the simple fact that these 
countries began their construction boom shortly after the others and, as 
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a result, had a relative - but not absolute - decline in construction 
activity; 
(b) At the beginning of the period under consideration (table 1), and 
before its heavy industries existed, the manufacturing sector appeared 
integrated with the non-oil sectors of the economy. This linkage was 
positive in the sense of demand linkages with non-oil GDP; factor scores 
(over the sectoral dimension) increased for Qatar with the inclusion of 
domestic linkages. At the same time, manufacturing in Qatar suffered 
through the negative effects associated with the Dutch disease (as 
reflected in the decline in factor scores from 0.27 to 0.19). In essence, 
Dutch disease effects were reducing the manufacturing output of Qatar 
below that anticipated from the benchmark (sectoral dimension) results. 
By the end of the oil boom (1981), the situation was as follows: 
(a) In Qatar, as well as most of the other oil countries, the oil sector 
continued to dominate resource allocation. Most likely, this reflected the 
fact that direct government expenditure of oil revenues had gone to 
expand government services and construction. The expansion of these 
sectors, with distributional activities, drew resources that might otherwise 
have gone to industrial activities; 
(b) In terms of the creation of domestic linkages, Qatar was still not 
experiencing any positive effects, in contrast to the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait. Each of these countries saw 
their industrial activities increase as a result of the growth of their non -oil 
economies; 
(c) The manufacturing sector in Qatar was still feeling some effects 
of the Dutch disease. This apparently resulted in a shift of resources to 
other activities. These shifts were not nearly as great as those experienced 
by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Finally, by 1985 the following conditions had emerged: 
(a) Manufacturing in Qatar was experiencing some positive linkages 
with the oil sector, which were still offset by negative linkages with the 
non-oil sector of the economy. In this regard, the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya was the only other country experiencing similar effects; 
(b) Perhaps because of relativeJ.y prudent monetary and fiscal 
policies, industrial output in Qatar was no longer affected by Dutch 
disease effects. Again, this was in sharp contrast to the situations in 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
The findings presented above are consistent with earlier ([17]-[23]) 
studies of developments in oil- based economies, whose experiences have 
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generally differed from those of the staple-based economies. It appears 
that in oil economies such as that of Qatar, the general absence (until 
recently) of significant spread effects has made the industrialization 
process much less predictable than in countries experiencing classic 
patterns of stable development ([15), and [24) and [25)). In this regard, 
the large role played by the Government of Qatar has resulted in the 
predominance of discretionary elements over market prices as the chief 
factor responsible for the allocation of resources. A similar set of public 
policies has created a comparable situation in Saudi Arabia ([12), [16), 
[26-29)) and Kuwait ([13) and [14)). 
In theory, Qatar should be a major beneficiary from the 
establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In fact, a major factor 
behind the establishment of the Council in 1981 was the desire to create 
a regional marketplace to relieve the almost total dependence on oil 
revenues and the massive cost of imports to meet the needs of the fast-
growing population, whether native or immigrant, in the Persian Gulf 
region. Unfortunately, the import statistics of Qatar [1) show that, in the 
first five years of the Council's existence, little changed. The following 
points are noteworthy: 
(a) Slightly over 50 per cent of the imports of Qatar still came from 
Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, Federal Republic of and United Arab 
Emirates; 
(b) Imports from the neighbouring Arab States in the Persian Gulf 
region amounted to only 5 per cent of the country's foreign supplies; 
(c) More than QR 2,000 million of a total import bill of 
QR 3,046 million went to machinery, transport and semi-manufactured 
and manufactured goods. 
With the uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
(August 1990) reducing private foreign investment in the region, the era 
of the rapid transformation and growth of Qatar's manufacturing industry 
seems to be over or at least in decline. The heavy industries are now in 
place and must, more than ever, prove their worth. The current economic 
uncertainties together with the proliferation of competing light industries 
throughout the Persian Gulf region can only reduce, unfortunately, the 
incentives for private-sector industrial investment in Qatar. 
G. Conclusions 
The arrival of a viable and self-sufficient manufacturing industrial 
structure has long been the prime objective of the Government of Qatar. 
Industry appears as the key to successful economic diversification and as 
the main assurance of continued self -sustaining economic growth. Since 
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the large increases in oil revenues in the 1970s, the Government has 
directed a substantial portion of its huge development outlays towards the 
creation of an adequate industrial infrastructure and the establishment of 
certain major State and joint public-private heavy industries. 
It is clear from the patterns described above, however, that industrial 
diversification has proceeded at rates lower than anticipated, and that this 
has stemmed from the lack of internal stimuli. This is particularly true 
for other sectors of the economy. Consequently, the process of 
industrialization has depended more on external rather than on internal 
dynamics. 
As al-Niajil [30] notes, for the countries of the Persian Gulf 
region as a whole, industrialization has been an external rather than an 
internal process, thus resulting in a false understanding of the true 
meaning of industrialization. The theory of industrialization in its 
broadest sense has been confused with the practical process of installing 
industrial plant through turnkey contracts with foreign construction and 
engineering companies. Factories set up in Persian Gulf countries on this 
turnkey basis belong to the region in a geographical sense, but the 
existence and continued functioning of the factories is dependent on 
external factors. In other words, the process of industrialization in the 
Persian Gulf region has tended to be a geographical rather than a 
historical phenomenon. These effects appear to be magnified in Qatar. 
Annex 
METHODOLOGY 
The main statistical tool used in the analysis above was factor 
analysis, and in particular oblique rotation factor analysis.• As used 
here, this technique was appropriate because it made it possible to: 
examine the correlations of a large number of variables by clustering the 
variables into factors such that variables within each factor are highly 
correlated; interpret each factor according to the variables belonging to 
it; and summarize many variables by a few factors. This factor analysis 
model expresses each variable as a function of factors common to several 
variables and a factor unique to the variable: 
ZJ = aj1F1 + aj2F2 + ... ajmFm + u~ 
where 
•Jn addition to Rummel [6], see James W. Franc and Mary Ann Hill, Annotated Computer 
Output for Factor Analysis: a Supplement to the Writeup for Computer Programme BMDP4M, 
Technical Report No. 8 (Los Angeles, MBDP Statistical Software, 1987). 
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the "jth" standardized variable 
the number of factors common to all the variables 
the factor unique to variable aJ 
factor loadings 
The number of factors, m, as well as the contributions of the unique 
factors, should be small. The individual factor loadings aJ1 for each 
variable should be either very large or very small, so that each variable is 
associated with a minimal number of factors. 
Variables with high loadings on a factor tend to be highly correlated 
with each other, and variables that do not have the same loading patterns 
tend to be less highly correlated. Each factor is interpreted according to 
the magnitudes of the loadings associated with it. The original variables 
can be replaced by the factors with little loss of information. 
Each case receives a score for each factor; these factor scores are 
computed as: 
F* I 
where bu are the factor score coefficients. 
Factor scores can be used in later analysis, replacing the original 
variables. These scores usually have less error, and are therefore more 
reliable measures, than the original variables. The scores express the 
degree to which each case possesses the quality of property that the factor 
describes. The factor scores have a mean and standard deviation of 1. As 
an example, in 1975 (see table 1) Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had 
by far the highest shares of output devoted to construction. At this time, 
construction accounted for a relatively low proportion of the production 
of Kuwait. 
In summary, there are four main steps in factor analysis. First, the 
correlation or covariance matrix is computed. Second, the factor loadings 
are estimated (the initial factor extraction). Third, the factors are rotated 
to obtain a simple interpretation (making the loadings for each factor 
either large or small, not in between). Finally, factor scores are 
computed. 
A key aspect of factor analysis is the concept of rotation. Factors are 
rotated to obtain a simple interpretation; in other words, the goal is to 
make the loadings for each factor either large or small, not intermediate. 
The common rotations are orthogonal and oblique. In orthogonal 
rotations, the factors are uncorrelated. In oblique rotation the scores can 
be correlated. However, the advantage of this rotation is that there is a 
greater tendency for each variable to be associated with the single factor. 
That is, in oblique rotations factors are formed that maximize the loadings 
of their component variables. 
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Computations were made using the BDDP Statistical package (1990). 
The data set used for the analysis was drawn from Arab Monetary Fund 
sources. It consisted of the national income accounts and sectoral output 
shares of member countries of the Arab Monetary Fund. 
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